

Docket	:	<u>A.15-04-003</u>
Exhibit Number	:	<u>ORA-1</u>
Commissioner	:	<u>L. Randolph</u>
ALJ	:	<u>K. Bemederfer</u>
Witness	:	<u>S. Hunter</u>



**OFFICE OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

**Prepared Testimony of the
Office of Ratepayer Advocates**

**Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Merced Falls Hydroelectric Project Sale**

San Francisco, California
January 22, 2016

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This exhibit presents the analyses and recommendations of the Office of
3 Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) regarding Application (A.) 15-04-003 filed on April 1,
4 2015 and amended on the same date by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company
5 (PG&E) to obtain Commission approval for PG&E’s proposed sale of the Merced
6 Falls Hydroelectric Project (Project) to Merced Irrigation District (MID).¹

7 ORA examined PG&E’s application and conducted an independent analysis
8 of the supporting workpapers, responses to data requests, and other discovery.

9 While ORA does not oppose PG&E’s proposed sale of the Merced Falls
10 Project to MID, ORA recommends that ratepayers should not be allocated the costs
11 related to the recent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) relicensing.²

12 PG&E requests the recovery of \$5.534 million from ratepayers associated
13 with the loss on the proposed sale of the Project, while ORA recommends the
14 recovery of \$2.684 million from ratepayers.

15

16 **II. BACKGROUND**

17 MID is a local publicly owned utility providing irrigation water to 3,100
18 agricultural customers, electrical service to over 110,000 customers, and drinking
19 water to the city of Modesto.

20 The Project, on the Merced River bordering Merced and Mariposa Counties,
21 is immediately downstream from MID’s Merced River Hydroelectric Project, and is
22 approximately three river miles upstream from MID’s Crocker-Huffman Diversion
23 Dam. It consists of a 3.5 megawatt (MW) hydroelectric powerhouse generating
24 approximately 14.4 gigawatt hours (GWh) per year, a concrete gravity dam, a 65-

¹ PG&E, A.15-04-003 (amended, Ap. 1, 2015) (public vers.), *available at*
<http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/SearchRes.aspx?DocFormat=All&DocID=149822059>

² See ORA Protest, A.15-04-003, at 3 (Issues to Be Considered).

1 acre reservoir, approximately 20.5 acres of land, FERC license, easements, and
2 water rights. It is operated as a base-load run-of-the-river facility.

3 MID operates the Project through an agreement with PG&E because the
4 Project is geographically isolated from PG&E's other hydroelectric operations but is
5 near MID's other hydropower facilities. Additionally, inflow to the Project is controlled
6 by MID's upstream dam and outflows from the Project's powerhouse are controlled
7 to match MID's downstream needs.

8 PG&E and MID discussed potential sale of the Project on and off for over six
9 years beginning in mid-2008³ and agreed to a sale price in 2015 of \$850,000.⁴ In
10 the meantime, PG&E continued pursuing FERC relicensing at an estimated cost of
11 \$2.85 million.⁵ The resulting pre-tax loss on sale is projected to be approximately
12 \$5.5 million, with PG&E proposing that the majority of that loss be allocated to its
13 ratepayers.⁶

15 III. DISCUSSION

16 PG&E has stated there were three options for the Merced Falls project: keep
17 it, sell it, or surrender the FERC license and decommission it. Costs for all three
18 options were projected in a net present value financial analysis using historic
19 revenue and expense data, current forecasts of future operations and maintenance
20 (O&M) costs, and projected replacement power costs.⁷ The cost to ratepayers if
21 PG&E were to keep the Project is estimated by PG&E to be \$23.7 million⁸ while

³ PG&E Prep. Test. at p. 2-4.

⁴ PG&E Prep. Test. at p. 2-6.

⁵ PG&E Appl. at 4.

⁶ PG&E originally proposed that the entire loss on sale be allocated to ratepayers (see PG&E Appl. at 6.) In its Prepared Testimony at p. 1-3, however, PG&E offered to allocate \$4,053 of the loss, one-third of the portion related to the value of land, roughly 0.07% of the loss, to shareholders.

⁷ PG&E Prep. Test. at p. 1-2.

⁸ *Id.*

1 under the decommissioning scenario it is estimated to be \$30.1 million.⁹ PG&E
2 proposes to sell the project to MID. The ORA issue regarding the sale is whether it is
3 reasonable for ratepayers to bear the entire loss on sale of \$5.534 million as
4 requested by PG&E.

5 PG&E provided 37 years of historical data to support its claim that the project
6 produces 14.4 GWh of electricity each year. This data shows that for the first 26
7 years, from 1974 through 1999, the amount of electricity generated annually was
8 over 15.4 GWh.¹⁰ This time frame includes six years of drought from 1987-1992.
9 When those drought years are removed, the average annual generation is 17.4
10 GWh.¹¹ This indicates that there is the potential for increased generation from the
11 project when the weather improves, which in turn might indicate that PG&E's
12 valuations of the project's future economics might be understated.

13 The project is not currently generating at the historical average level. Between
14 2000 and 2007, annual production averaged 12.4 GWh with one year (2006) at or
15 above PG&E's stated average of 14.4 GWh.¹² The water flow into the project for
16 those eight years appears to have been lower than it had been historically in other
17 non-drought years. There is no explanation provided by PG&E for this except that
18 the project is a "run of the river" powerhouse dependent on flow released by MID's
19 upstream dam. The buyer in this transaction (MID) is the same entity that controls
20 the flow of water into, and thusly, the annual production from the project. Despite this
21 drop in production, PG&E made no effort to sell the project or consider other
22 options¹³ when it was more financially viable. More importantly, the FERC license
23 was still in full effect during those years. If a sale had been made prior to the FERC
24 relicensing requirement, then the FERC relicensing costs would have been incurred

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ PG&E Responses to Data Request ORA-PG&E-001, question 1, attachment 3: MercedFalls_MonthlyGeneration.pdf (dated June 4, 2015).

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ Offering the project at auction to another willing buyer or renegotiating terms with MID, for example.

1 by the new owner. The license renewal costs of \$2.85 million will now provide a
2 benefit for up to fifty years to the new owner, MID.¹⁴

3 In February 2009, PG&E filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) with FERC to begin the
4 process of renewing its license.¹⁵ PG&E claims that the talks with MID were stalled
5 in late 2009 due, in part, to MID's focus on relicensing its own hydropower facilities,
6 and its concerns about the "uncertain outcome" of the Merced Falls FERC
7 relicensing process. Timothy Konnert, FERC's Western Division Chief, informed
8 ORA¹⁶ that the majority of costs in the relicensing process are incurred during the
9 NOI period because this is when environmental impact studies are prepared,
10 meetings with stakeholders are held, and state and local oversight agencies are
11 initially engaged. When asked if there was a process by which FERC projects in
12 close proximity to one another could be merged into one license, and if there could
13 be cost savings from such an integration, Mr. Konnert answered affirmatively:
14 integration is possible, on a case-by-case basis, when it can be considered prudent
15 by FERC, and there could be cost savings from gained efficiencies if the required
16 studies, meetings, oversight, etc. for both projects could be coordinated. In fact, Mr.
17 Konnert said MID might apply to integrate the Merced Falls project with its own
18 projects in the future. When asked if there was any uncertainty in the Merced Falls
19 NOI process, Mr. Konnert replied that there is always some uncertainty in FERC
20 licensing but it is mostly questions of costs and adaptations, rather than the license
21 itself being in danger: mitigating damage to native wildlife, negotiating water release
22 amounts to ensure irrigation needs are met, etc.

¹⁴ The Federal Power Act (FPA) authorizes FERC to issue hydropower licenses for up to 50 years in length. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 798-802.

¹⁵ The FERC license expired in February 2014 and has been extended annually since then. See PG&E Prep. Test. at p. 1-1.

¹⁶ Append. 1, ORA telephone interview by Stacey Hunter with Timothy Konnert, FERC's Western Division Chief (Jan. 6, 2016).

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**Table ORA-1
Proposed Allocations of Gain/(Loss) on Sale**

Assets	PG&E's Proposed Allocation		ORA's Proposed Allocation	
Depreciable Assets:*	100% to Ratepayers	(\$5,526,031)	FERC relicensing costs to Shareholders[^]	(\$2,850,000)
			Remainder to Ratepayers	(\$2,676,031)
Non-Depreciable Assets (Land):	67% to Ratepayers	(\$8,228)	67% to Ratepayers	(\$8,228)
	33% to Shareholders	(\$4,053)	33% to Shareholders	(\$4,053)
Total Pre-tax Gain/(Loss):		(\$5,538,312)		(\$5,538,312)
Total Allocation to Shareholders		(\$4,053)		(\$2,854,053)
Total Allocation to Ratepayers		(\$5,534,259)		(\$2,684,259)

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* Depreciable Assets includes the relicensing costs in Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).
[^] The \$2.85 million in relicensing costs incurred through December 2014 consists of: preparation of the required FERC application and other filings (\$570,000); performing required environmental studies (\$990,000); conducting required consultation with agencies and stakeholders (\$520,000); and Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (\$770,000).¹⁷

9 **IV. SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATION**

10 While ORA does not oppose PG&E's proposed sale of the Merced Falls
 11 Project to MID, ORA recommends that ratepayers should not be allocated the costs
 12 related to FERC relicensing. Table ORA-1 above compares PG&E's revised
 13 requested allocation of the loss on sale of the Merced Falls Project versus ORA's
 14 recommendation. ORA recommends that PG&E's ratepayers bear only \$2,684,259
 15 of the proposed recovery.

16 PG&E management made a number of independent decisions regarding the
 17 Merced Falls project which resulted in increased costs that PG&E now requests to
 18 allocate to its ratepayers. Given the knowledge that the project was producing lower
 19 generation for many years, even before the current drought, PG&E could have more
 20 actively pursued selling the project much earlier before the costly NOI process was
 21 started. It could have settled on a lower price to offset some of the FERC-related

¹⁷ PG&E prepared testimony, p. 2-7.

1 costs to MID and/or it could have negotiated the release of more water from MID's
2 upstream project to improve the project's potential revenue. Instead, PG&E chose to
3 wait *for years* for MID to decide – after the costs for the FERC license had been
4 incurred, costs that could have been avoided to some degree had MID merged the
5 project with its own before the NOI period – to agree to buy the project.
6

1 **VI. APPENDIX 1 – DECLARATION OF STACEY HUNTER**

2 I, Stacey Hunter, declare:

3 1. I am employed by the California Public Utilities Commission as a Public Utilities
4 Regulatory Analyst IV in the Office of Ratepayer Advocates, Energy Cost of Service and
5 Natural Gas Branch, and am assigned to the proceeding PG&E, A.15-04-003.

6 2. On or about January 6, 2016, I conducted a telephone interview with Timothy Konnert,
7 FERC’s Western Division Chief, during which Mr. Konnert stated the following:

8 2.1. The majority of costs in the relicensing process are incurred during the NOI period,
9 because this is when environmental impact studies are prepared, meetings with
10 stakeholders are held, and state and local oversight agencies are initially engaged.

11 2.2. When I asked Mr. Konnert if there was a process by which FERC projects in close
12 proximity to one another could be merged into one license, and if there could be
13 cost savings costs resulting from such an integration, Mr. Konnert answered
14 affirmatively as follows: integration is possible, on a case-by-case basis, when it can
15 be considered prudent by FERC, and there could be cost savings from gained
16 efficiencies if the required studies, meetings, oversight, etc. for both projects could
17 be coordinated. Mr. Konnert also said that MID might apply to integrate the Merced
18 Falls project with its own projects in the near future.

19 2.3. When I asked Mr. Konnert if there was any uncertainty in the Merced Falls NOI
20 process, he replied that there is always some uncertainty in FERC licensing but it is
21 mostly questions of costs and adaptations, such as mitigating damage to native
22 wildlife, negotiating water release amounts to ensure irrigation needs are met, etc.,
23 rather than the license itself being in danger

24 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

25
26 Date and place: January 22, 2016, San Francisco, California.

27
28 /s/ Stacey Hunter

29 Stacey Hunter